e-ISBN: 978-1-60384-043-9 (e-book)

Niccolo Machiavelli - The prince (2008, Hackett Pub. Co) - libgen.lc.pdf

Start p.g. 91

99: Hereditary states are easier to retain due to the populace being accustomed to the Prince's lineage. The longer the lineage, the more likely he will be loved, unless suspect to overwhelming vices. Stability causes complacency.

107: It is easier for a new prince to claim a populace if they previously had a prince. The longer a populace is free (such as a republic), the less likely they are to adjust to a totalitarian system. Transitions are easier with the homogeneity of customs. The previous lineage must, however, we wiped out lest there be a reinstatement. Possible threats (including those with political influence) must be fully eliminated – exiles do not work.

107: If a new prince claims a populace with heterogeneous language, customs and institutions, the best remedy is for the new prince to reside within the new populace. Transparency and public (compassionate?) availability reduces resentment. Personal involvement also allows one to see disorders for oneself and quickly remedy them before they get out of hand.

109: If a new prince cannot personally reside within the new populace, the second-best option is integrating the new populace through colonial settlements that expand on the claimed region instead of superimposing upon it. Blending the new and old populaces into a single populace breaks down segregation and gives a sense of community rather than a lower caste dominion. Additionally, disgruntled individuals are dispersed throughout the blended populace, creating a disincentive to revolt.

111: To retain a new populace, a new prince should not enforce garrisons nor should they replace settlements. Doing so amplifies hardships and resentment; segregation also makes it easier for planned revolt.

116: A new prince must always be diligent and beware of potential threats. War can be postponed but is inevitably unavoidable. It is better to defeat an opponent when they arise than to let them grow strong. Additionally, colony states must be kept small until the populace is fully blended – all it takes is a traitor to invite a Trojan horse to undermine everything.

125: Never help someone become more powerful than oneself, otherwise they will ultimately betray you through destruction or absorption. Nevertheless, allies are permittable, but allies must be maintained thoroughly as a mercenary force instead of a partnership – a partnership could also be viewed as a remote feudal system where serfs are more loyal to their baron than the prince. A partner is a potential enemy for they are a bargaining chip for one's own enemies as either a rival or a hostage. As a rival, one's partner could ally with the enemy to become a monarch; as a hostage, a partner could we a key weakness in undermining everything.

129: A new prince must never succeed to a remote feudal lineage and instead divide his kingdom into sections ruled by temporary agents. Said agents are administrators that are moved around and replaced. A prince must never allow the populace to become subservient to an agent – as soon as a populace is loyal to an agent, they are not fully loyal to the prince and therefore a potential threat. Sections within the kingdom must therefore be maintained through temporary agents whose power can be retracted by the prince without endangering the prince's position.

137: If a new prince is to acquire a populace that was once free, the prince can either (1) devastate them into submission; (2) personally reside along with them; (3) allow them freedom yet extract fealty as a mercenary – in this way, the only indignation is the tax owed the new prince, yet as long as the new prince promises to protect their freedom from other aggressors and the new prince's army is significantly stronger, then the acquired populace should not have any qualms for what is considered a good deal. For the purpose of (3), the new prince must still keep the free state well disposed towards him, the acquired state must be shown that it cannot survive without the prince's good will and power; they must be shown why they should have gratitude instead of resentment – they must be willingly grateful and not brainwashed or forced. As (3) is the most difficult and willing gratitude can possibly be overcome with rosy retrospection and false memories of superior ancient liberty, (1) and (2) are more favourable. If a populace has not been free for long, then (2) is the most economical, however, the longer a populace has been free, the more suitable (1) is.

143: A new prince must follow the path previously followed by great men so that even if they do not measure up / if they are unsure of their own path to follow, they will at least know how to avoid the previously discovered pit traps; additionally, they can fake their own success until they make it.

149: A new prince will be successful if interdependent, however, they must always have the capacity to become independent in their own rights. They cannot afford to rely on fortune (luck) and must diligently construct their princedom from nothing. Once attained, a new prince must always have a powerful military, after all, power is the only stable thing.

153: It is better to face hardships when acquiring a new princedom than to face them when retaining one: build from the ground up rather than maintain an ailing one.

155: An ordinary citizen can become a prince through armed forces and fortune (luck).

177: An ordinary citizen can become a prince through iniquity.

191: An ordinary citizen can become a prince through the aid of his fellow citizens: a civil princedom. The attainment of a civil princedom requires fortunate astuteness; two opposing classes exist in every city – the common who want to be neither governed nor oppressed by the rich and the rich who want to govern and oppress the common – and if the opportunity arises, one must align oneself with a single faction if one wished to become a prince. If one is not fortunate enough or fails to align oneself, then one of three consequences arises from the conflicting desires of the common and nobility: someone else rises to princedom, freedom, or anarchy.

193: It is better to rise to princedom with the backing of the commoners for they are easy to appease and most are willing to obey. The rich are also few and are less willing/unable to revolt. A prince must be independent of the rich yet wary for in bad times, the ambitious will strike.

201: Once a prince is in power, he must not only maintain good relationships with the common but also make the populace dependent on him so they will never revolt.

205: A prince must always have enough wealth or men to assemble an army that can do battle with anybody coming to attack them. Their princedoms must be capable of self-sufficiency and well-fortified. The populace must also have great respect for military exercises.

212: Ecclesiastical princedoms are the most secure because faith transcends mankind.

221: Mercenary and auxiliary armies are useless in the long run. A prince must command his own army and lead by example. If he cannot, then a republic armed with its own troops may suffice.

237: Auxiliary armies are much more dangerous; unlike mercenaries, they are organized and are liable to backstab.

247: A prince's sole occupation should be war: not necessarily waging physical conflict, but understanding and utilizing it in everyday life. A prince who does not understand war is doomed to lose his princedom.

255: How what ought to live and how one truly lives is completely different. A prince cannot be an ideal figure. He must manipulate the reality of the situation and understand that he will always be criticized.

263: A prince must appreciate being stingy. Frugality will lower taxes, prevent debt, prepare for instant war, earn grudging respect and create opportunity. Being stingy allows generosity, but not vice versa. People hate losing generosity more than they appreciate moments of generosity from one who is stingy. Regret is greater than gratitude.

267: The greatest threat to generosity is generosity: you can never give enough.

271: Replace stingy for ruthless, frugal for compassionate (see 263). Safer to be feared than loved.

273: Dread of retribution is stronger than bonds of obligation. However, fear should not turn to hatred.

285: In order to secure a safety net, a prince must never say or do anything without one of the following qualities: compassion, fidelity, integrity, humanity, piety. Piety is the ultimate scapegoat for nobody but God can judge you.

287: To avoid contempt, a prince must avoid being: fickle, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, indecisive.

288: There are two threats to a prince: internal and external. External threats can be eliminated with a good army which either annihilates opposition or entices them into being allies.

295: The government is the perfect arbiter and scapegoat for a prince.

299: A new prince cannot prevent from being hated. A new prince must satiate the largest group (193) for the greatest security until his reputation is great enough to restrain all groups.

319: Award confidence to those you suspect (can be in the form of firearms) and they will trust you. Treat a person like a criminal and they will become a criminal. Trust must be given before it is received, but always be prepared to be backstabbed.

323: A prince should divide his populace (129) in peace for control, but unify them in a time of war.

331: Embarking upon great enterprises gives a prince the greatest prestige.

335: It is almost always better to choose sides early and fight resolutely than remain neutral. If you win then your ally is indebted to you; if you lose your ally will provide refuge and the possibility of future winnings. Alliances should only occur out of necessity (when it comes to attacking others), otherwise, they should be avoided.

341: Reward people for taking risks for they help financially support a princedom, yet maintain dignity and don't be overly generous.

343: A prince is known by his ministers. A good minister puts his own life second to the Prince. A prince must make the minister dependent on him. Mutual trust is the key.

349: Flatterers are dangerous, yet those who tell only the truth are more so. A prince should only allow a council of wise men to tell the truth in private and only when asked. A prince should ask for the truth freely, however, yet only act upon what he wishes.

359: A prince always prepares for a storm when the weather is fine.

363: It may be fate that a flood should occur, yet within the scope of fatalism, a prince has the power to decide how devastating the flood may be. There are always precautions and options.